SQuIRRL

The domains rail, road, and aviation undergo digitalization, which introduces new communication links with safety-critical aspects. Securing those links is thus an increasing concern. Established security algorithms are not computationally difficult enough to compete with the expected performance and availability of quantum computers. In contrast, QKD relies on the laws of quantum mechanics and thereby enables the exchange of cryptographic keys for the post-quantum era.

In the railway domain, a parallel challenge is the physical exposure of infrastructure, including field elements and vehicles. For instance, there are electronic beacons between the rails along the tracks. These so-called balises are used for train positioning and thus safety-relevant. At the same time, the balises are vulnerable to manipulation with realistic efforts. With higher efforts but also stronger safety implications, similar security aspects apply for switches, light signals, locomotives, and interlockings. For these elements, security is an increasing concern, especially in a digitalized and politically tense context.

In the automotive domain, the goal is similar, namely to secure the communication between vehicles and infrastructure elements. Because the communication pattern is not as prevailing as in the railway domain, fewer overall direct communication points result. Current central topics are securing vehicle software updates and the communication between vehicles and charging stations. Considering, e.g., charging stations and charging vehicles, physical exposure is also a significant challenge.

In the aviation domain, the IT infrastructure tends to be physically protected to a higher degree as in the aforementioned domains. Still there is the risk of unauthorized access (e.g., cleaning staff). Additionally, there are airports significantly lagging behind European standards in personnel screening and other protection measures. Nevertheless, maintenance should be possible globally, including software updates. Moreover, various components from different manufacturers need updating, necessitating protection between manufacturers.

The examined mobility domains partly share communication characteristics. This especially concerns the communication between stationary and mobile communication endpoints, i.e., between infrastructure and vehicles. Pairs of communication endpoints can mostly be estimated well. For example, train and aircraft movements follow a schedule, electric cars tend to regularly return to a specific charging station. However, the communication endpoints cannot be forecasted definitively for non-trivial cases. Trains and aircraft might need to take detours, owners of electric cars might move. Since QKD needs a physical link for key exchange, novel concepts and architectures are needed to facilitate use cases in mobility domains.

All three domains are also subject to comprehensive and strict authorization criteria. The development of hardware and software components must adhere to many laws and standards (e.g., by ISO, ETSI, UNECE, UIC, ERA, EBA, BSI, EUROCAE, RTCA, JAA). Therefore, the project must consider potential authorization in all areas to enable the applicability of the results.

Derived from the commonalities and differences, the SQuIRRL project considers cross-domain:

1. The development of cost-effective, scalable, and hardened communication units for entanglement-based QKD solutions, and
2. the development of communication concepts, architectures, protocols, and implementations for mobility use cases being: secure and generic; based on the above QKD solutions; aligned with confidentiality, integrity, and availability requirements.

The technical feasibility of integration will be demonstrated for three specific domains:

• Railway
  1. Securing communication between field elements and interlocking systems (stationary machine to stationary machine).
  2. Securing radio communication between locomotives and interlocking systems (mobile machine to stationary machine).
  3. Securing communication between on-board and landside staff to ensure authentic and integrous digital commands (mobile human to stationary human).
• Automotive
  1. Securing communication between charging station infrastructure and vehicles.
  2. Unique identification of road vehicles to secure software updates for safe operations.
  3. Securing Vehicle-to-everyting (V2X, e.g., vehicle-to-vehichle, vehicle-to-infrastructure, etc.) communication.
• Aviation
  1. Unique identification of avionic components aboard aircraft to verify the installation of correct keys and software.

The project is funded for three years with a total of over five million Euro by the Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space (Bundesministerium für Forschung, Technologie und Raumfahrt; BMFTR; formerly: Federal Ministry for Education and Research; Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung; BMBF). The consortium partners are Quantum Optics Jena, Chemnitz University of Technology, Technische Universität Berlin, Technische Hochschule Ingolstadt, Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft Dresden, Fraunhofer Institute for Integrated Circuits IIS, University of Stuttgart and X-Fab Global Services.