

Dependable Systems

Software Dependability

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Sources:

Wilfredo Torres-Pomales. Software Fault Tolerance: A Tutorial.

Brian Randell and Jie Xu. The Evolution of the Recovery Block Concept.

Lui Sha. Using Simplicity to Control Complexity.

Goloubeva, O., Rebaudengo, M., Reorda, M. Sonza, and Violante, M.,
Software-Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance, Springer, 2010.

Several publications by Avizienis et al.


Software Dependability

- Four inherent properties that make software hard [Brooks 87]
 - **Complexity** - Huge number of states with non-linear interactions
 - **Conformity** - Software must fulfill outside / inside system expectations
 - **Changeability** - New and revised system functionality is appealing
 - **Invisibility** - Real activity reasoned by the code is mostly not obvious

Forget Hardware ...

- In 1990 there were an estimated **120 billion lines** of source code being maintained (Ulrich, 1990).
- In 2000 there are already about **250 billion lines** of source code being maintained, and that number is increasing (Sommerville, 2000).
- As a result, the amount of code maintained **doubles in size every 7 years** (Müller et al., 1994).
- Older languages are not dead. E.g. **70%** or more of the still active business applications are written in COBOL (Giga Information Group).
- There are at least **200 billion lines of COBOL-code** still existing in mainframe computers alone (Gartner Group).
- Source: <http://www.cs.jyu.fi/~koskinen/smcosts.htm>
- Some collected reference data and fault models for software available, e.g.
 - <http://hissa.nist.gov/effProject/> , <http://www.amber-project.eu/>

Fault Dependencies in the System Stack [Schmidt]



System Stack Failure Scenarios

- User or usage-caused failures: Data deletion, resource overuse, ...
- Administration-caused failures: Deletion of application data, deletion of user information, improper configuration change for a different goal, ...
- Application failures: Incorrect abortion, data corruption, hanging runtime environment, memory leaks, file access denied by wrong security setting, ...
- Middleware failures: Unreachable naming services, database index corrupt, database log corrupt, deadlocks, slow performance, ...
- Operating system failures: Full disk, dead / frozen / runaway processes, I/O corruption through driver bugs
- Hardware failure: CPU, memory, network, backplane, ...
- Environment failure: Power outage, flooding, room / building destroyed, ...
- Infrastructure failure: DNS not reachable, network down / too slow, eMail not available, licence server not available, authorization does not work, ...

Software Dependability

- **Fault elimination**

- Reduce number of dormant faults at development time


- Fault-tolerant software

- Techniques to achieve fault tolerance for software faults
 - Application of redundancy idea to software modules

- Software fault tolerance

- Techniques to achieve fault tolerance by software mechanisms
 - Typically for hardware failures on lower levels in the system stack
 - Redundancy managed by operating system, cluster framework, application code

Fault Elimination through Software Testing



Testing Approaches

- **Integration testing**

- Top-down integration: Start with system skeleton
 - Better in discovering design errors in the system architecture
 - Allows limited prototype at an early stage
- Bottom-up integration: Incremental integration of dependent components
 - Makes test development easier

- **Release testing resp. acceptance testing**

- Only based on system specification
- Increase vendor's confidence into the product readiness

Testing Approaches

- **Component / unit testing**

- Defect testing in an isolated code piece
- Component might be function, class, or composite component with interface

- **Object class testing**

- Complete coverage would mean to test all operations, all attribute combinations, all possible object states
- Inheritance brings problem of localizing the test candidate

Test Case Design

- Aims at good validation and defect testing coverage
- Design approaches
 - **Requirements-based testing**
 - Often implemented by deriving test cases from described use cases
 - **Partition testing**
 - Often input parameters can be clustered - take one candidate from each set
 - Typically applications with mathematical operations (<, >, <<, >>, even, odd, ...)
 - **Structural testing resp. white box testing**
 - Knowledge of the program is used to identify additional test cases
 - Exercise all program statements (not all code paths)

Test Oracles [Hoffman]

- Compare output of a system to the output expected by the oracle, for a given input
- **True oracle** - reproduces all relevant results using an independent platform
- **Stochastic oracle** - verifies statistically selected set of samples
 - Limited resources, small input set available
- **Heuristic oracle** - consider continuous nature of output data
- **Sampling oracle** - specific choice of criteria other than statistical randomness
 - Typical approach for testing border cases
- **Consistency oracle** - use results from earlier tests as reference
 - Examples: Intermediate results, call trees, data values, earlier versions of the functionality

Test Oracles [Hoffman]

	True Oracle	Stochastic	Heuristic	Sampling	Consistent
Definition	Independent generation of expected results	Verify a randomly selected sample	Verify selected points, use a heuristic for remainder	Verify a specially selected sample	Compare run n results with $n-1$
Example of use	Algorithm Validation	Operational Verification	Algorithm Verification	Boundary Testing	Regression Test
Advantages	Possibility for exhaustive testing	Can automate tests with a simple Oracle	Easier than True Oracle	Very fast verification possible with simple Oracle	Fastest; Can generate and verify large amounts of data
Dis-advantages	Expensive implementation. Possibly long execution times	May miss systematic and specific errors. Can be time consuming to verify	Can miss systematic errors and incorrect algorithms	May Miss Systematic or Specific Errors	Original run may include unknown errors

Testing Through Software Fault Injection

- Intentionally trigger erroneous behavior of the execution environment
 - Typical approach for communicating software entities
 - Orientation towards implementation details - program state, functional behavior
 - Several non-intrusive implementation techniques, such as AOP
 - Injection can be done as part of execution under real conditions
 - Huge variety of fault classes, including SWIFI fault classes
 - New approaches support remote fault injection (e.g. fuzzing)
- **Compile-time injection:** Leads to erroneous image being executed
- **Run-time injection:** Demands some altering of application state during runtime
- Typical triggers: Time-out, exception, debugging trap, code insertion

Software Dependability

- Fault elimination
 - Reduce number of dormant faults at development time
- **Fault-tolerant software**
 - Techniques to achieve fault tolerance for software faults
 - Application of redundancy idea to software modules
- Software fault tolerance
 - Techniques to achieve fault tolerance by software mechanisms
 - Typically for hardware failures on lower levels in the system stack
 - Redundancy managed by operating system, cluster framework, application code

Fault-Tolerant Software

- Fault-tolerant software unit: Continues to deliver service in an error state
 - Non-fault-tolerant software unit is called **simplex unit**
- Examples
 - Algorithmic calculation problems
 - Need to investigate units, operators, intervals, limits, ranges, FP handling, ...
 - Problems with input data
 - Units, ranges, change quantity or frequency, ...
 - Prevention: Assertions for invalid values, checks for type ranges
 - Problems with initialization, interfaces, control logic, omission of system parts, timing /synchronization, exceptional conditions

Software Fault Model [Goloubeva]

- Example: Control loop writing computation result to a variable
 - **Temporary fault:** Write NULL to result variable after end of usage
 - **Permanent fault:** Compute and store incorrect output from input data
- Single vs. multiple faults depends on granularity level of investigation
- On **source code level**
 - Program: Structured collection of features with syntax and semantic
 - Syntax allows to describe fault model
 - Negation of semantic properties defines a fault model
 - Examples: Calling non-existent functions, Functions not returning a value, values out of their type range, missing input parameters
- On **executable level**, e.g. stack overflow due to recursion

Fault-Tolerant Software

- **Forward-error recovery**

- Feasible in control loop / real-time systems, since propagation is predictable
- Timing faults with the real-time criteria would be more severe
- Typical example: N-version programming

- **Backward-error recovery**

- In case of unpredictable error propagation effects
- Typically expensive in terms of time
- Ensure best-possible correctness of ultimate computational outcome
- Large variety in examples: Retry, restart, reboot, checkpointing, audit logs, transactions, recovery blocks, wrappers ...

Fault-Tolerant Software -

Another categorization [Lyu 95]

- **Single version techniques**

- Add mechanisms for detection, containment, and handling of errors to the software component itself
- Examples: Software structure and actions approaches, error detection, exception handling, checkpointing and restart, process pairs, data diversity

- **Multi version techniques**

- Rely on structured utilization of variants of the same software
- Examples: Recovery blocks, N-version programming
- Principles can be applied to any software layer
 - Identify source of most design faults
 - Typically no problem with parallel application, beside cost factor

Single-Version Approaches - Wrapper

- Piece of software that encapsulates a given program when it is being executed
- Typical approach for operating systems and middleware stacks
- Structure: **Wrapper software** and **wrapped entity**
- Inputs and outputs are checked by the wrapper
- Examples:
 - Dealing with buffer overflow, checking scheduler correctness (e.g., EDF), bypassing known bugs, checking output correctness
- When pre- or postconditions are violated, usually an exception is being raised
- Wrapper forms an **acceptance test** in the **dependability rings**
- Good approach for fixing issues in the operational phase of software

Single Version Approaches - Software Structures and Actions

- **Partitioning**

- Isolate functionally independent modules - unit of mitigation pattern
- Horizontal (n-tier architectures) vs. vertical partitioning (factoring)

- **System closure**


- No action is permissible unless explicitly authorized
- Any capability damaged only disables a valid action

- **Temporal structuring**

- Enable atomic interactions between components without disturbance
- From outside: Either terminates correctly, or is aborted upon error detection


Single Version Approaches - Checkpointing

- Save application state data at recovery points
 - Can be reloaded on crash or any other kind of data loss
 - Possible on different levels: local per process, partial, complete, distributed
- Optimum checkpointing interval
 - Checkpointing too frequent: Majority of time spent for data saving
 - Checkpointing too rare: May take long time to recover
- Several specialized solutions for C / C++ language, easier with reflection support
- Popular approach in clusters / high-performance computing
 - Latest trend: In-memory checkpointing






taken from
Software Fault Tolerance: A Tutorial

Single-Version Approaches - Process Pairs [Pradhan 96]



taken from
Software Fault Tolerance: A Tutorial

Single Version Approaches - Data Diversity [Ammann 88]



Single Version Approaches - High-Level Instruction Duplication [Goloubeva]

- Introduce data and code redundancy through high-level transformation
 - Duplicate every variable
 - Perform every write operation on both copies of the variable
 - After each read operation, the copies must be checked for consistency
 - Should be close to read operation, in order to avoid error propagation
 - Includes also expression evaluation
 - Procedure parameters treated as variables
- Independent from underlying hardware, targets cache / main memory faults

```
a=b;  
.. becomes ...  
a0=b0;  
a1=b1;  
if (b0 != b1)  
    error();  
...
```

```
a=b+c;  
... becomes ...  
a0=b0+c0;  
a1=b1+c1;  
if ((b0!=b1) || (c0!=c1))  
    error();
```


High-Level Instruction Duplication

```
res=search(a);  
...  
int search(int p)  
{  
    int q;  
    ...  
    q=p+1;  
    ...  
    return(1);  
}
```

```
search(a0, a1, &res0, &res1);  
...  
void search(int p0, int p1, int *r0, int *r1)  
{  
    int q0, q1;  
    ...  
    q0=p0+1;  
    q1=p1+1;  
    if (p0 != p1)  
        error();  
    *r0=1;  
    *r1=1;  
    return;  
}
```

- Performance impact
 - Code segment size: 3-4x
 - Data segment size: 2x
 - Executable code size: 3-4x
 - Performance drop: 2-3x

Selective Instruction Duplication - RECCO


- Trade-off between performance penalty and reliability increase
- Example: Reliable Code Compiler (RECCO) [Benso et al.]

- **Code reliability analysis**

Determine *reliability weight* for each variable

- Life period:
First write to last read on the same data (lines of code)
- Lifetime: Sum of all life periods
- Functional dependencies:
Identify variables v that are descendants of variable w
-> v is written as result from an expression containing w
-> Variable dependencies graph of error propagation
- Reliability weight:
Lifetime + Sum(Weights of the descendants)

```
d=a*b+c;  
e=d+a;  
f=b*c+1;  
g=e+f;
```



Selective Instruction Duplication - RECCO

- **Code re-ordering phase**

- Decompose application into independent domains
 - Each domain does not interfere with the others
 - All operations inside a domain can be re-arranged
- Per domain, each operation gets a reliability weight (sum of weights of involved variables + weight of updated variable)
- Re-schedule operations for reducing weights
 - Variable lifetime can decrease, when heavy operations move up


- **Variable duplication phase**

- Introduce shadow variables at specific points
- Since weight may not be constant, duplication can be done occasionally

Control Flow Error


- Control flow error (CFE) leads to unexpected instruction execution
- Terminology:
 - Basic block (BB) - branch-free serial code fragment
 - Branch / jump instruction is modeled as last instruction of a basic block
 - Control flow graph (CFG) - one node per basic block
 - Illegal branch - Node transition is not part of the CFG
 - Wrong branch - Node transition is already part of the CFG
 - Inter-block error - Erroneous branch to different block
 - Intra-block errors - Erroneous branch inside a block

```
i=0;  
while (i<n) {  
-----  
    if (a[i] < b[i])  
-----  
        x[i]=a[i];  
-----  
    else  
        x[i]=b[i];  
-----  
    i++;  
}
```



Control Flow Error - Model

- CFE model example
 - Type 1: Illegal branch from end of a BB to the beginning of another BB
 - Type 2: Wrong branch from end of a BB to the beginning of another BB
 - Type 3: Illegal / wrong branch from end of a BB to any point in another BB
 - Type 4: Illegal / wrong branch from any point of a BB to any point in another BB
 - Type 5: Illegal / wrong branch from any point of a BB to any point in the same BB
- Fault model example
 - Branch offset modified (Type 1/2/3 CFE)
 - Branch condition modified (Type 2 CFE)
 - Non-branch instruction -> branch instruction (Type 4/5 CFE)
 - Branch instruction -> non-branch instruction (Type 1/2 CFE)




CFE Approaches

- CFE Detection [Tung et al.]
 - Based on static code extension during compilation
 - Signature (symbolic name) for each procedure, embedded in the code
 - Currently executed signature stored in special register
 - Check on procedure entry / exit if signature matches
 - Before procedure call, current signature is left on separate stack, and new signature is stored in register
 - Does not need complete control flow analysis, transparent for user
 - Easy tradeoff between check frequency and overhead
 - Small coverage of CFEs (procedure calls)

CFE Approaches

- Block Entry Exit Checking (BEEC) [Miremadi]
 - Signature: Sum of the size n of the BB instructions and the size k of a call instruction
 - Entry routine
 - Stores address of first BB instruction ($m+1$) in separate static buffer
 - Exit routine
 - Adds static buffer value ($m+1$) to signature ($n+k$), and compares result with the address of the last BB instruction ($m+n+k+1$)
 - Modifies return address to skip the signature




CFE Approaches

- Error Capturing Instruction (ECI) [Halse et al., Wingate et al.]
 - Insert trap instruction in data areas, unused memory areas, or in skipped parts of the program code
 - Examples: Software interrupt, unconditional branches, calls, jumps
 - Trigger error handling routine, or infinite loop detected by a watchdog
- Available Resource-Driven Control Flow Monitoring (ARC) [Schuette]
 - Schedule checking code in idle VLIW functional units
 - Tracking task: Update signature during program execution
 - Checking task: Checks run-time signature during execution (e.g. in loops or at exit points for the program)
- Both approaches do not support Type 5 CFEs

CFE Approaches

- CFC via regular expressions [Benso et al.]
 - Assignment of unique block symbol per BB
 - Each path of the CFG can be represented by a string of symbols
 - All block symbols form alphabet A
 - Regular expression R allows to generate valid symbol strings
 - All legal paths form a language $L=(A, R)$
 - Use concurrent process to check if input string belongs to L
 - Check frequency allows trade-off tuning
 - Detects all Type 1 CFEs, some of Type 3 and 4

$A = (a, b, c, d, e, f)$
 $R = a(b(c|d)e)^*f$



CFE Approaches

- Assertions for Control Flow Checking (ACFC) [Venkatasubramanian et al.]
 - Special *execution status (ES)* variable assigned to each program, one bit per BB
 - At program end, check if all BBs were traversed (bits at 1)
 - Bit flip by XOR, to detect unintended re-execution of BB
 - *if-then-else*: Same BB bit assigned to both branches, since only one should run
 - *loop*: Check performed in the last BB of the loop construct, then ES value is set to the value before the loop
- Partially covers types 1,3,4

```
ES_1=0;
ES_1=ES_1^01;
i=0;
while(i<n) {
    ES_1=ES_1^10;
    if (a[i]<b[i]) {
        ES_1=ES_1^100;
        x[i]=a[i];
    } else {
        ES_1=ES_1^100;
        x[i]=b[i];
    }
    ES_1=ES_1^1000;
    if (ES_1!=01111) error();
    ES_1=01;
    i++;
}
if (ES_1!=01) error();
```

Multi-Version Approaches

Recovery Blocks

- Redundant system implementations are typically used simultaneously, best answer is picked i.e. by voting
- Alternative way: Sequential execution of *recovery blocks*
 - Introduced in 1974 by Horning et. al.
 - Dynamic fault tolerance approach, related to stand-by sparing in hardware

```
establish Checkpoint
    Primary Module
Acceptance Test, else
    load Checkpoint
    Alternative Module 1
Acceptance Test, else
    load Checkpoint
    Alternative Module 2
    ...
else          Failure Exception
```

Recovery Blocks

- **Primary module**

- Debugged and tested non-redundant software, which hopefully meets specifications
- At the beginning, checkpointing resp. **recovery cache** is filled

- **Acceptance test**

- Reasonableness check of the calculated results
- Acceptance tests per block, might lead to final *error handler*
- Must be simple to not contain design faults on its own


- **Alternate module** is a standby software to be executed if primary module fails

- Possible primary / alternate module failure conditions


- Failure of acceptance test, detected failure to terminate, implicit error detection (e.g. division by zero), failure exception of an inner recovery block

Recovery Blocks

- Limited overhead (execution only in error case), redundancy in time
- **Diversity of redundancy** implementation is relevant
 - Even results might be different, as long as they are acceptable
- Checkpoint before first block needed to ensure same preconditions
- Make successive block more simple, maybe loose parts of the result
- Might be accompanied by a Watchdog timer for some deadline support
- Problems: Shared global data, lack of alternative algorithms, added complexity
- Can be nested, can span multiple processes
- Major impact from acceptance test
 - Reasonableness checks, timing checks, reversal tests, replication tests



Example: Recovery Blocks



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Recovery Blocks - Example

- Application of concept in Naval Command and Control system software, 1985
 - 8000 lines of additional codes, utilized PDP-11 hardware extension for checkpointing
 - Failure coverage of over 70%
 - 60% addition in software implementation costs for fault-tolerant version
 - 33% extra code memory during runtime
 - 35% extra data memory
 - 40% additional run time

Extensions to Recovery Block Concept

- **Distributed Recovery Blocks** by Kane Kim
- Forward recovery scheme with emphasis on real-time applications
- Pair of self-checking processing nodes
 - **Primary node** and **shadow node** both run a recovery block scheme
 - Two-phase structured cycle for less synchronization overhead -
Input acquisition and output phase
 - Nodes use **different modules as the primary one**
 - Approach for uniform treatment of hardware and software faults
- Acceptance test first checks primary, and then shadow node

Primary Node	Backup Node
Begin the computing cycle (Cycle).	Begin the computing cycle (Cycle).
Receive input data from predecessor computing station (Input).	Receive input data from predecessor computing station (Input).
Start the recovery block (Ensure).	Start the recovery block (Ensure).
Inform the backup node of pickup of new input (Status-1 message).	Inform the primary node of pickup of new input (Status-1 message).
Run the primary try block (Try).	Run the alternate try block (Try).
Test the primary try block's results (AT). The results fail the AT.	Test the alternate try block's results (AT). The results pass the AT.
Inform backup node of AT failure (Status-2 message).	Inform primary node of AT success (Status-2 message).
Attempt to become the backup— rollback and retry using alternate try block (on primary node) using same data on which primary try block failed (to keep the state consistent or local database up-to-date). Assume the role of backup node.	Check AT result of primary node (Check-1 message). The primary node failed. Assume the role of primary node.
Test the alternate try block's results (AT). The results pass the AT.	Deliver result to successor computing station (SEND) and update local database with result.
Inform backup node of AT success (Status-2 message).	Tell primary node that result was delivered (Status-3 message).
Check AT result of backup node (Check-1 message). It passed and was placed in the buffer.	—
Check to make sure the backup node successfully delivered result (Check-2 message).	—
Backup was successful in delivering result (No Timeout).	—
End this processing cycle.	End this processing cycle.

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
Extensions to Recovery Block Concept

- **Retry blocks with data diversity [Ammann and Knight 1987]**
 - Not the algorithm is varied, but the input data
 - Easy and inexpensive to implement, since only data re-expression must be added
- Recovery for concurrent systems
 - Problem of cascaded rollbacks - **domino effect**
 - Recovery and process communication are not synchronized
 - Rollback affects connection partners and spreads out

Conversation Scheme

- **Conversation scheme [Randell et al. 1975]**

- Processes enter a conversation asynchronously, only communication inside
- Each process entering a conversation is check-pointed
- Global acceptance test (conversation test line)
 - If any process detects an error, all participants must perform a rollback and use their next alternative module then
- All processes leave the conversation together
- Only communication inside the conversation
- Need to prevent *information smuggling* - the altering of application state outside of the conversation



Multi-Version Approaches - N-Version Programming



- Common mode errors are only catchable by **design diversity**
- Design diversity is a complex issue
 - Design philosophies, software tools, programming languages, test philosophies
- Typical approaches try to utilize randomness - separate teams on different locations
- **N-Version Programming**
 - Suggested by Elmendorf in 1972, developed by Avizienis & Chen in 1977
 - Static approach, combination of decision mechanism and forward recovery
 - At least two independently designed and functionally equivalent variants
 - Variants are executed in parallel, decision mechanism selects the „best“ result
 - Can support reliability, but also system security against **malicious logic**

N-Version Programming


*„N-version programming is defined as the **independent generation** of $N \geq 2$ functionally equivalent programs from the **same initial specification**. The N programs possess all the necessary attributes for concurrent execution, during which **comparison vectors (“c-vectors”)** are generated by the programs at certain points. The program state variables that are to be included in each c-vector and the **cross-check points (“cc-points”)** at which the c-vectors are to be generated are specified along with the initial specification.*

*“Independent generation of programs” here means that the programming efforts are carried out by N individuals or groups that do not interact with respect to the programming process. Wherever possible, **different algorithms and programming languages (or translators)** are used in each effort. The initial specification is a formal specification in a specification language. The goal of the initial specification is to state the functional requirements completely and unambiguously, while leaving the **widest possible choice of implementations to the N programming efforts**. The actions to be taken at the cc-points after the exchange of c-vectors are also specified along with the initial specification. ” (Avizienis 1977)*

Comparison [Avizienis]



Example: N-Version Programming



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N-Version Programming

- Driver resp. **control program**
 - Invokes each of the versions
 - Waits for the versions to complete their execution
 - Might also include the **decision module**
- Requirements for successful NVP, also hold for NMR
 - Consistency of all inputs and initial conditions over the modules
 - Reliable decision algorithm
- Resource and development costs / effectiveness tradeoff
 - Can be solved by software - hardware combination
 - Examples: Boeing 737-300, Airbus A-310, Airbus A-320 flight computers

N-Version Programming

- Large variety of options for the **decision module**, e.g.
 - Basic majority voter that waits for all results first
 - Perform vote whenever a new result arrives and the old vote was unsuccessful
- Method is intended for multiprocessor environments
- Attractive solution when continuity of service is a critical issue
- Relevant elements to the approach
 - Approach for initial specification and parallel development efforts (**process**)
 - Product of that process (**software**)
 - Runtime support and decision approach (**executive**)

N-Version Programming

*„The second major observation concerning N-version programming is that its success as a method for on-line tolerance of software faults depends on whether the residual software faults in each version of the program are distinguishable. **Distinguishable software faults** are faults that will cause a disagreement between c-vectors at the specified cc-points during the execution of the N-version set of programs that have been generated from the initial specification. Distinguishability is **affected by the choice of c-vectors and cc-points**, as well as by the nature of the faults themselves.*

*It is a **fundamental conjecture** of the N-version approach that the **independence of programming efforts will greatly reduce the probability of identical software faults** occurring in two or more versions of the program. In turn, the distinctness of faults and a reasonable choice of c-vectors and cc-points is expected to turn N-version programming into an effective method to achieve tolerance of software faults. The effectiveness of the entire N-version approach depends on the validity of this conjecture, therefore it is of critical importance that the **initial specification should be free of any flaws that would bias the independent programmers** toward introducing the same software faults.” (Avizienis 1977)*

NVP - Design Process

- Inconsistencies and omissions in the V-spec can bias the independent design efforts
- Simplex software specification tends to formulate „what“ and „how“
 - Latter part can influence diversity aspect
- Diversity can take place in
 - Training, experience and location of the developers
 - Application algorithms and data structures, testing methods and tools
 - Programming languages, software development methods and tools
 - **Random diversity** (of individuals) vs. **required diversity** (in implementation)
- **Matching features** - Needed for execution as fault-tolerant module cluster
- Distinct specifications (from one requirement document) vs. formal specification

NVP - Programming Process

- Choice of a suitable software development process for an individual version
 - Aims at maximum isolation and independence
 - Encourage greatest diversity of the implementations
 - Avoid **fault leak links** that introduce **related software faults**
- **Rules of isolation** - Ongoing process to avoid fault leak links between teams
 - **Communication and documentation protocol**
 - Supervise team information flow
 - Ensures archiving of messages for later process root cause analysis
 - **Coordinating team**

NVP - Coordinating Team

- Prepares and distributes specification and test data sets
- Sets up the communication and documentation protocol
- Supervises NVP process and the rules of isolation
- Collects and answers inquiries from teams
- Conduct formal reviews, coordinate synchronization points in the development
- Gather and evaluate all documentation, conduct acceptance tests
- All communication preferably in written format, to have fault leaks documented for post-mortem analysis

NVP - Executive

- Set of generic functions to run multiple software variants in a coordinated fashion
- Proper **matching features** are defined by the specification
- High dependability, fast operation - can be hardware, software, or combination
- Basic functions
 - Decision algorithm(s) and assurance of input consistency
 - Inter-version communication facility, enforcement of timing constraints
 - Local supervision per version
 - Global decision function for version error recovery

N-Version Programming

- Success depends on the permanent faults in each variant being distinguishable
- Variants could also be used for improved testing
 - Has danger of letting the variants progressively become closer
- Initial specification must be free of flaws, otherwise no real divergence
 - Common residual design faults
- Global data structures still need to be unified
- Choosing small modules implies [Stringini and Avizienis]
 - Frequent invocation -> low error latency, but high overhead
 - Less computation with less data on rollback, but more data to checkpoint / vote

NVP Case Study

- *A. Avizienis, M. R. Lyu, and W. Schuetz. In search of effective diversity: a six-language study of fault-tolerant flight control software. In Digest of 18th FTCS, pages 15–22, Tokyo, Japan, June 1988.*
- University experiment with industry support for the development of an automatic aircraft landing system
 - Real specification for a flight control computer, algorithms, control laws - pitch control problem was taken out
- Three-member coordinating team, only minimal information to developers
- Independent programming teams, combination of required and random diversity
 - Different programming languages, but not different algorithms (timing, matching)
 - Procedural languages (C / Pascal), OO languages (Ada / Modula 2), logic language (Prolog), functional language (Lisp variation)

NVP Case Study

- 12 week-phase of version generation, six teams of two persons
 - Training phase - Meetings with all developers, explanation of isolation requirement
 - Design phase - Each teams discusses with domain expert and coordination team
 - Coding phase - Independent development, no communication between teams
 - Unit testing phase - Same test data for all teams
 - Integration testing phase - Same test data for all teams
 - Acceptance testing phase - Full flight simulation, iterative debugging with teams
- Communication protocol
 - Questions from programmers only to coordination team by eMail, response in 24h
 - Expert consulted by coordination team

NVP Case Study

- 120 questions from six teams, 30 answers broadcasted
- First results after acceptance test
 - Number of lines with / without comments, number of executable or arithmetic statements, number of modules, mean number of statements per module

Metrics	ADA	C	MODULA-2	PASCAL	PROLOG	T
LINES	2253	1378	1521	2234	1733	1575
LN-CM	1517	861	953	1288	1374	1263
STMTS	1031	746	546	491	1257	1089
MODS	36	26	37	48	77	44
STM/M	29	25	15	10	16	25

NVP Case Study

Test Phase	ADA	C	MODULA-2	PASCAL	PROLOG	T	Total
Coding/Unit Testing	2	4	4	10	15	7	42
Integration Testing	2	5	0	2	7	4	20
Acceptance Testing	2	4	0	0	4	10	20
Total	6	13	4	12	26	21	82

Table 2: Fault Classification by Phases

Fault Class	ADA	C	MODULA-2	PASCAL	PROLOG	T	Total
Typographical	0	1	0	0	9	0	10
Omission	1	3	0	0	8	5	17
Unnecessary Code	1	0	0	2	0	2	5
Incorrect Algorithm	3	5	2	6	9	13	38
Spec. Misinterpretation	1	3	1	4	0	1	10
Spec. Ambiguity	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Other	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Total	6	13	4	12	26	21	82

Compiler
bug

Table 3: Fault Classification by Fault Types

NVP Case Study

- Only one identical fault, based on mis-read specification text
- All cross-checks and recovery point routines written in C
 - Additional interoperability problem with diverse languages
- Evaluation performed by requirements-based stress testing and structural analysis
- One problem caused by unconsidered late specification update
- Severe structural faults by **underground variables**
 - Introduction of new, unspecified state variables that are not considered in the cross-check
- Some implementations did not consider corrected results from the decision module

NVP Case Study

- Conclusion
 - Original specification contain too much implementation hints for diversity
 - Order of computations has strong impact on diversity possibilities
 - Use of different programming languages supports team isolation
 - Failure to follow NVP design rules lead to some structural faults
 - Similar and time-coincident errors were rare

NVP Independence Evaluation

- *John C. Knight and Nancy G. Leveson. An Experimental Evaluation of the Assumption of Independence in Multi-Version Programming.*
- NVP relies on assumption that independent software version fail independently
 - Faults occur at random and are unrelated
 - Probability of common mode failures (identical incorrect output) assumed small
 - Additional costs for multiple versions would be offset by reduced validation costs
 - But: Even in mechanical systems, common design faults are a serious threat
- NVP used in crucial systems
 - Slat and flap control system of the Airbus A310
 - Point switching, signal control, and traffic control in Gothenburg railways

NVP Independence Evaluation

- Experiment
 - Graduate students from two universities, 27 programs
 - Requirement specification and golden unit from previous NVP experiment
 - No development methodology imposed, predefined language and system
 - No restrictions on reference and documentation sources
 - Fifteen input data sets with given output, for debugging
 - 200 randomly generated test cases for acceptance test, different sets per version to avoid ,filtering' of common mode failures by the acceptance test
 - Final examination with one million random tests, comparison of version result with golden unit result

NVP Independence Evaluation

- Approx. one half of total software faults involved two or more versions
- All common faults involved students from different schools
- Examples for correlated faults across versions
 - Misunderstandings in numerical analysis (angle comparison)
 - Misunderstandings in geometry (not considering special cases)
- Some conclusion
 - Common mode faults are application-specific, so NVP might be still very valuable
 - Certain parts of any problem are just more difficult
 - Semantic aspects, human misconception, missing details in the specification
 - Unique faults tend to be more likely detected by compilers / testing

Comparison of Approaches

- *Timothy J. Shimeall and Nancy G. Leveson. An Empirical Comparison of Software Fault Tolerance and Fault Elimination. February 1991*
- Comparison of five software fault detection approaches
 - Run-time assertions
 - N-version programming with multi-version voting
 - Vote is used as test oracle
 - Varying specification languages and development practices
 - Functional and structural testing
 - Code reading by stepwise abstraction (without comments to avoid biasing)
 - Static data-flow analysis with pre-defined algorithms

Comparison of Approaches

- Experiment setup
 - Set of programs written from a single specification for combat simulation
 - Tree-step data transformation, 2600-4500 input data values
 - Senior-level students for software engineering, teams of two persons
 - One set performed architectural designs, coding, and debugging to pass pre-defined acceptance test
 - Disjoint set of students to detect faults in the programs
- Report generation per fault, administrator acts as final arbiter for false alarms
- Acceptance test designed to execute each of the major code portions at least once

Comparison of Approaches

- Comparison between fault elimination and fault tolerance
 - Voting tolerates faults, assertions have the potential
 - Claim by Avizienis et al. - Multiversion might reduce the need for testing
 - Are the same faults detected by fault elimination and voting ?
 - Is a particular testing type irrelevant when voting is used ?
 - Difficult comparison: One tolerated error condition does not mean that all error conditions from this fault are handled
- Results
 - 67 faults handled only by voting, 28 only by assertions, 119 only by fault elimination; 27 detected by both voting and fault elimination
 - On average, the voting triplets only tolerated 38% of the failures

Comparison of Approaches

- Comparison of testing techniques with respect to fault detection
 - Data shows that most of the faults detected by each technique were not found by no other technique
- Code reading
 - Found incorrect formulas, missing checks, bad conditions on branches, missing condition checks for special cases
 - Did not find any globally missing code or missing application logic
 - False alarms: From code that was difficult to abstract, from inconsistent implementation strategies (e.g. variable naming), from syntactical focus
- Static data flow analysis
 - Found only initialization faults, but is cheap

Comparison of Approaches

- Voting
 - Found missing paths in the program, parameter ordering flaws, wrong variable usage, wrong ordering of operations
 - Missing check of specific conditions not found by voting approaches, more success with boundary test cases
- Run-time assertions
 - Found parameter ordering flaws, wrong variable usage
 - No detection of missing code flaws
 - Simple range checks detected 23 flaws not detected by any other approach

Comparison of Approaches

- Functional and structural testing
 - Found wrong ordering of operations, missing check of specific conditions, missing functionality or missing single program paths
 - Incompleteness through module-by-module testing approach
 - Best effectiveness with atypical data sets
- Variation in effectiveness mostly reasoned by
 - Ability to examine internal state (problem for voting)
 - Scope of evaluation (problem for assertions / code reading)

Comparison of Approaches

Class	Comments	Detecting Technique
Overrestriction	e.g., forcing all weather to move northeast, rejecting legal input	Assert, Read, Test, Vote
Loop Condition	e.g., infinite loop	Vote, Assert, Test
Calculation	Incorrect formula	Read
Initialization	Variable not initialized	Stat. Analysis, Test
Substitution	Wrong variable used	Vote, Assert
Missing Check	Exceptional case not handled e.g., divide by zero	Read
Branch Condition	Bad condition on a branch	Vote, Read, Test
Missing Branch	Localized missing code to detect and handle specific conditions in normal execution	Read, Test
Missing Thread	Missing path throughout program	Vote, Test
Unimplemented Requirement	Missing functionality on all paths	Test
Ordering	Operations in wrong order (e.g., updating value before use)	Vote, Test
Parameter Reversal	Actual parameter order permuted with respect to formal parameter	Vote, Assert
Data Structure	e.g., linked list becomes circular	Vote, Test, Read, Assert


Damage Confinement Strategies

- Checking error conditions at interface
- Law-Governed Systems [Minsky91]
 - Constraints on interactions are externalized, set of rules enforced at run-time
 - Specialized approaches for message exchange between objects
 - Static vs. dynamic enforcement mechanisms, power depends on language
 - Rule-enforcement facilities might have their own state:
 - „Method X of object Y is only invocable if this process holds a token.“
- Voting
 - High costs, problems with stateful functionality

An Alternative: Simplex Approach

- Approach by Lui Sha, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Where to spend the money: Multiple diverse versions, or one ultra-robust version ?
 - Relationship between reliability, development effort, and code complexity
 - Proposed model: Failure rate is proportional to software complexity C and inversely proportional to development effort E
- Example: Assuming $t=1$
 - Decreasing rate of reliability improvement for increasing effort
 - With more complexity comes higher effort for same reliability
 - Effort E == costs, typically constant

$$R(t) = e^{-\lambda t} = e^{-Ct/E}$$




Simplex

- N-Version Programming

- Total effort E , divided by three teams; assuming $C=1$

$$R_{NVP} = R_M^3 + 3R_M^2(1 - R_M) \qquad R_M = e^{-3/E}$$


- Optimistic assumption: Failure rate is inversely proportional to square of software development effort (red)
- Pessimistic assumption: Failure rate is inversely proportional to square root of software development effort (blue)
- Single-version approach always outperforms NVP
 - But multiple versions might be obtainable much cheaper




Simplex

- Recovery blocks
 - System works as long as any alternative works (perfect acceptance test)
 - For three alternatives: $R_{RVB} = 1 - (1 - R_M)^3, R_M = e^{-3/E}$

With three-way divided effort, some minimum effort is needed to get better reliability by recovery blocks




With two alternatives, complexity reduction of alternative (by factor 2 resp. 10) brings huge improvement for the same effort



Simplex

- Idea: Using simplicity to control complexity
 - Forward recovery approach, based on feedback loop
 - **HAC subsystem** - Simple construction, formal methods, reliable hardware
 - **HPC subsystem** - Complex technology, advanced features
- HPC can use HAC output, but not vice versa
- Decision logic based on control loop output
- Typically performance degradation with HAC
- Example: Boeing 777 primary and secondary flight controller



Software Dependability

- Software testing
 - Reduce number of dormant faults at development time
- Fault-tolerant software
 - Techniques to achieve fault tolerance for software faults
 - Application of redundancy idea to software modules
- **Software fault tolerance**
 - Techniques to achieve fault tolerance by software mechanisms
 - Typically for hardware failures on lower levels in the system stack
 - Redundancy managed by operating system, cluster framework, application code

Software Fault Tolerance

- Can be realized on different levels
 - Operating System - Failover and / or load-balancing cluster framework
 - Database, middleware stack
 - Application itself
 - Combination of the above methods
- Maintenance is an issue
 - Failover success rate above 90% is understood as good value
 - Understanding of a „major outage“ is driven by SLA
 - Crashes can leave garbage behind
- New wave with fault tolerance through virtualization technologies


Server vs. Client

- Fault tolerance for the server
 - Object replication (passive vs. active)
 - Object group properties (Property Manager interface)
 - Creating fault-tolerant objects (Generic Factory interface, Object Group Manager interface)
 - Fault detection and state transfer
- Fault tolerance for the client
 - Failover (try again with another address, duplicate prevention)
 - Addressing (server supplies an updated address)
 - Loss of connection (client ORB should be informed properly)

Object Replication

- Replicas of an CORBA object form an **object group**
 - Referenced using an Interoperable Object Group Reference (IOGR)
 - *FTDomainId, ObjectGroupId*
 - Members identified by *FTDomainId, ObjectGroupId, Location*
 - Strong replica consistency, simplifies system design
 - Common interface for all replicas
 - Clients remain unaware and invoke operations as if it were a single object
 - Replication transparency and failure transparency
 - Object group can be created and managed by the infrastructure

Interoperable Object Group Reference




Interoperable Object Group Reference

- IOGR usage by client
 - Direct connection to primary
 - Profile addresses gateway
- IOGR might not reference to latest membership status
 - TAG_GROUP_VERSION received by server
 - Server GVN == client GVN: Process request
 - Server GVN > client GVN: Throw LOCATE_FORWARD_PERM
 - Server GVN < client GVN: Get new IOGR from ReplicationManager

Replication Manager

- Each FT domain is managed by a single replication manager
 - Takes care of object groups and their FT properties
 - Inherits interfaces for *Property Manager*, *Object Group Manager* and *Generic Factory*
- Property Manager interface
 - Set / get fault tolerance properties for object group, all replicated objects of a type, for specific replicated object at creation, or for executed replicas
- Generic Factory interface
 - Invoked by application to create / delete an object group
 - Implemented by application and invoked by replication manager / application to create and individual object replica


Generic Factory Interface



(C) Eternal Systems

Object Group Manager

- Management of object groups
 - *create_member()*, *add_member()*, *remove_member()*,
set_primary_member(), *locations_of_members()*, *get_object_group_ref()*,
get_object_group_id(), *get_member_ref()*




Fault Management


- Components to monitor replicated objects
 - Report faults such as a crashed replica or crashed host
 - Notification service which distributes fault reports
- *Fault Detector* - part of infrastructure, supplier of fault reports to *FaultNotifier*
- *Fault Notifier* - receives fault reports from fault detectors and fault analyzer
- *Fault Analyzer* - specific to application, both consumer and supplier of fault reports
- Propagation of fault event through notification interfaces
(*CosNotification::StructuredEvent*,
CosNotification::EventBatch)
- Different types of fault events (*ObjectCrashFault*)

Domain_name = FT_CORBA	
Type_name = ObjectCrashFault	
FTDomainId	mydomain
Location	myhost/myprocess
TypeId	IDL:Bank:1.0
ObjectGroupId	1

Fault Management



FT Corba Example - Hello World



Server Launcher Implementation

1. Initialize the ORB
2. Obtain a reference to the replication manager
3. Narrow the reference to the *Property Manager* interface
4. Invoke *set_type_properties()* to configure the settings
 - e.g. initial and minimum number of replicas, replication style
5. Narrow the reference to the *Generic Factory* interface
6. Invoke *create_object()* to create the replicated object
7. Publish IOGR in a file for the client to read

Server Factory Implementation

- *create_object()* invoked by FT CORBA environment
 1. Extract ObjectID, check *type_id* for the object to be created
 2. Create the object and activate it
 3. Record object identity locally to enable deletion
 4. Return object reference
- *main()*
 - Initialize ORB and POA, create the *Factory* object
 - Initialize FT CORBA
 - Connects to Replication Manager, invokes factory to create objects

FT Corba Example - Client

```
// Obtain the Hello Server Object Reference:  obj
...
// Narrow the object to a Hello Server
HelloServer_varserver =HelloServer::_narrow(obj);
if (!CORBA::is_nil((HelloServer_ptr)server))
{
CORBA::String_varreturned;
const char* hellostring= "client";
//  Invoke the hello() method of the remote server
returned = server->hello(hellostring);
cout << returned << endl;
}
```